This chapter addresses the financial management functions of Dallas Independent School District (DISD) in the following sections:
- A. Budget Development and Monitoring
- B. Accounting Operations
- C. Internal/External Auditing
- D. Tax Collections
- E. Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) Reporting
B. ACCOUNTING OPERATIONS (PART 2)
DISD's method for delivering payroll transmittal forms to the Payroll Department creates a risk that the forms could be altered. Each pay period, campus and department personnel deliver payroll transmittals to the Payroll Department in unsealed envelopes. The payroll transmittal is the record of attendance that serves as the basis for payment. The district has had problems with employees tampering with payroll transmittals en route to Payroll. During a 1997 overtime audit, internal auditors noted that "Time cards did not reflect or support the hours shown on the transmittals.... We noted [examples]...where the hours on the transmittals did not agree to the time card for the same period. It appears in some cases that the transmittals were altered." Some employees who delivered their department's payroll transmittals were tampering with them en route to the Payroll Department. In response, internal auditors recommended that the district review its procedures for submitting transmittals to the payroll department.
At present, only certain individuals are authorized to deliver payroll transmittal forms to Payroll. However, this procedural change does nothing to resolve the basic problem; the payroll transmittal envelope still can be opened before it arrives in Payroll. Principals and department heads do not seal or lock the envelopes after placing their transmittals inside. Consequently, payroll clerks have no way of knowing whether the transmittals have been tampered with en route to the department.
KPMG recommended in their fiscal 1999 and 2000 Management Letters that "standardized delivery methods should be used to help reduce the occurrences of misplaced transmittals and late delivery and to ensure payroll transactions are processed timely and accurately." The district responded that it is testing modifications to the Delta system that will allow schools and departments to enter time electronically. The district has also responded that it is in the process of acquiring an integrated financial system that will allow electronic entry of payroll transmittals.
While this electronic entry capability is the ultimate solution to the problem, until the new system is adopted payroll transmittals continue not being safeguarded while en route to the Payroll Department.
Purchase lockable bank-bag type envelopes for payroll transmittal.
The district should use a more secure envelope for delivering payroll transmittals to the Payroll Department. An envelope with a special seal or a lockable bank deposit bag would serve the purpose and ensure that payroll transmittals are not tampered with en route to the Payroll Department.
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND TIMELINE
1. The chief financial officer instructs the Payroll director to acquire payroll transmittal envelopes that can be sealed. August 2001 2. The Payroll director acquires the envelopes and issues instructions to district personnel that payroll transmittal envelopes must be sealed before they are sent to the Payroll Department. August 2001 3. The Payroll director implements the new procedure throughout the district. August 2001
The district could purchase lockable and re-usable bank-bag type envelopes for about $25 each, based on a quote received from a local vendor. Therefore, the cost to implement this recommendation would be $12,500 (500 x $25) in 2001-02. One-half of the envelopes would need to be replaced every year, therefore one-half of that cost is recognized each year thereafter.
Recommendation 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 Purchase lockable bank-bag type envelopes for payroll transmittal. ($12,500) ($6,250) ($6,250) ($6,250) ($6,250)
The Payroll Department continues to experience problems with employee overpayments. In 1999, external auditors conducted a fraud audit of DISD. Their March 2000 report noted 419 instances of payroll overpayments in payroll records from 1996 through 1999. Auditors conservatively estimated the overpayment amount to be $475,000. The 419 employees reported as being overpaid were identified as being 402 inactive employees, 15 employees on leave of absence and two that were deceased.
The auditors obtained these overpayments from the T3 Status Report, a list the Payroll Department maintains of overpaid employees. Whenever an employee is overpaid for excess leave, overused sick time, or terminations for which paperwork was not received timely, the overpayment is classified as T3.
A T3 status report obtained in December 2000 indicated that 56 current and former employees owe the district about $63,000 in overpayments. This figure represents only those overpayments that have been identified by the district and documented in payroll records. Exhibit 7-24 summarizes overpayments in excess of $2,500.
Exhibit 7-24Source: DISD Payroll Department.
Payroll Overpayments-Employees in T3 Status
Overpayments Amount Explanation A $2,607.51 Employee terminated on 10/4/00. Should have only been paid for 19 days but was paid for 37.5 days. B $4,368.92 Employee resigned effective 8/31/00. Payroll notified of termination on 10/13/00. Employee paid for September and October. C $2,682.88 Employee recommended for termination in September 2000. Payroll notified of termination in November. Employee was overpaid 25 days in October. D $2,983.07 Payroll did not receive termination notice in time to prevent employee from being paid. E $2,535.42 Payroll did not receive termination notice in time to prevent employee from being paid. F $6,704.12 Employee worked only four days but was paid for two months because payroll did not receive termination papers in time to avoid overpayment. G $3,314.33 Employee was out on medical leave, but payroll received no notification and paid one month's regular salary. Other $38,185.03 Various Total $63,381.28
Generally, overpayments occur because the Payroll Department does not receive timely notification that an employee has terminated in time to avoid an overpayment. Late notification results because no single district employee is held responsible for notifying Payroll when an employee terminates. For example, in one instance noted above, an employee's supervisor wrote, "Apparently he [the employee] did not complete an S54 [termination notice]." In another instance, an employee was recommended for termination on September 21. But when the employee completed the S54 termination notice, this person indicated a termination date of October 20. Typically, an employee's direct supervisor is held responsible for providing timely notice of termination, not the employee.
Hold immediate supervisors responsible for notifying the Payroll Department of employee terminations, and reduce their department's budget by the amount of overpayments for which they are responsible.
The Payroll Department cannot prevent overpayments if they do not receive timely notification that an employee has terminated. An employee's immediate supervisor should be held responsible for notifying the Payroll Department when an employee terminates. Instead of relying on the paper S54 form before taking action, other methods such as e-mail should be used. In fact, the district should design an electronic version of the S54 form that supervisors could forward to Payroll as soon as employees terminate. Finally, the district should strictly enforce these policies and impose decisive corrective measures when they are not followed. For example, by reducing the budget of the offending department by the amount of the overpayment.
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND TIMELINE
1. The chief financial officer instructs the Payroll director to develop a master list of supervisors who have responsibility for notifying Payroll of employee terminations. August 2001 2. The chief financial officer instructs the Payroll supervisor to inform these supervisors of their responsibilities and the procedures to follow when an employee terminates. September 2001 3. The chief financial officer instructs the Payroll supervisor to devise, in cooperation with Human Resources, a quicker means of providing notification of employee termination. November 2001 4. The Payroll supervisor and Human Resources develop a new procedure for expediting notification of employee termination and disseminate this procedure throughout the district. December 2001
This recommendation can be implemented with existing resources.
DISD offers direct deposit to its employees but has a relatively low participation rate. Direct deposit makes payroll processing more efficient for the district and more convenient for the employee. Direct deposit benefits employees by saving time, eliminating trips to the bank and allowing for deposits even when the employee is on vacation or sick; in addition, direct deposit eliminates the potential of paycheck fraud.
Many DISD employees may not understand the benefits of direct deposit or trust the process. Other districts boost direct deposit participation through increased, focused marketing efforts such as paycheck stuffers, newsletters, campus flyers and discussions of the benefits of direct deposit during new employee orientation.
DISD's direct deposit efforts include offering direct deposit during employee orientation, sending employees frequent direct deposit reminders, placing messages on paychecks, training office managers to present direct deposit to employees and partnering with the Dallas Teacher's Credit Union to offer direct deposit when employees open an account.
Exhibit 7-25 compares DISD's direct deposit participation rate to those of its peers.
Exhibit 7-25Source: DISD Payroll Department and Peer Surveys.
Direct Deposit Participation-DISD and Peers
District Percentage Houston 98% San Antonio 80% Austin 75% Dallas 63% El Paso 62%
Note: Fort Worth data not submitted.
Although the Payroll Department advertises the benefits of direct deposit through traditional methods such as employee orientation presentations and paycheck envelope stuffers, the district does not offer direct deposit on DISD's Intranet. Some districts post information on its Web site citing the advantages of direct deposit and explaining how employees can request, change and stop direct deposit arrangements. Some allow employees to sign up for direct deposit on the district's Intranet site.
In addition, DISD has not explored partnership possibilities with the Teacher's Credit Union or other Dallas financial institutions. These institutions might be willing to provide DISD employees with financial incentives to open direct-deposit accounts at their bank, such as free checking or higher interest rates on certificates of deposit. These incentives would be free to the district while providing the bank with more depositors and DISD employees with the benefits of direct deposit.
Expand direct deposit marketing efforts through the use of the district Intranet, weekly publications, incentives, partnerships with banking institutions and a "direct deposit week."
Surveys could help the district understand why some employees do not favor direct deposit. Using these survey results, the district should focus its marketing efforts on specific employee attitudes and populations. For example, safety should be emphasized if the survey results show that employees don't trust the process. Similarly, efforts could be directed towards categories of employees if survey results show high percentages of non-users in a category such as bus drivers or food service workers.
The district should consider implementing a direct deposit week. During this week, employees who have direct deposit and understand its benefits would be asked to wear badges that read "Ask Me About Direct Deposit" or "Ask Me Why I Use Direct Deposit." Flyers promoting the benefits of the program should be posted at strategic locations throughout the district such as break rooms and teachers' lounges. Each school and district location should set up an area where employees could sign up for direct deposit or obtain more information about the program.
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND TIMELINE
1. The chief financial officer instructs the Payroll director to use innovative methods to market the district's direct deposit program. August 2001 2. The Payroll supervisor conducts a survey to determine why employees do not use direct deposit. August 2001 3. The chief financial officer instructs the Treasury Department to develop a financial institution partnering program and to identify and contact area financial institutions that might be interested in partnering with the district in marketing direct deposit. August 2001 4. The chief financial officer and the Payroll supervisor work in conjunction with DISD technology personnel to offer direct deposit information, including signup forms on the district's Intranet. September through November 2001 5. The chief financial officer and Payroll supervisor establish a task force to organize a direct deposit week in the district. September 2001 6. The chief financial officer instructs the Payroll supervisor to advertise the benefits of direct deposit in all district publications and to continue traditional efforts to market the program. September 2001 and Ongoing 7. The Payroll supervisor uses the survey information to focus and fine-tune the district's direct-deposit marketing efforts. November 2001 and ongoing
This recommendation can be implemented with existing resources.
Accounts payable operations are critical to any organization that must acquire goods and services to achieve its objectives. DISD's Accounts Payable Department is budgeted for 14 positions; at this writing, one is vacant. Exhibit 7-26 presents the department's organization.
Exhibit 7-26Source: DISD Financial Operations.
Accounts Payable Organization
During fiscal 2000, the Accounts Payable Department processed 192,883 invoices and issued 69,654 checks for a total of $251,391,792.
The Accounts Payable Department has experienced significant problems with the Delta financial system and is dissatisfied with it. Since its installation in 1998, the system has been modified extensively for accounts payable and other applications. In fact, a Unisys consultant has an office at the district and works full-time maintaining it. In addition, a section of Financial Operations called Financial Systems Technical Support provides full-time computer assistance and support for all finance-related areas.
The Delta system affects the Accounts Payable Department's efficiency in several ways. For example, staff cannot work on the Delta system while checks are being printed. Accounts Payable prints checks on Monday and Thursday of each week. Each check run takes about three hours to complete. Consequently, each clerk has about six hours per week of downtime in which accounts payable clerks are assigned other duties such as requesting outstanding receiving reports from schools and departments; sending invoice discrepancy notices to vendors; calling vendors to resolve invoice discrepancies; cataloging invoices with discrepancies for follow-up; reviewing returned vendor checks; and verifying invoices to purchase orders for correct line items.
Seven clerks are directly involved in paying invoices. Therefore, this downtime translates into 42 staff-hours per week or 168 hours per month of potentially inefficient time caused by the Delta system.
Exhibit 7-27 describes workarounds the department must employ due to the limitations of the Delta System.
Exhibit 7-27Source: DISD's Accounts Payable Department.
Delta System Workarounds
System Limitations Workaround Procedure Effect on Efficiency System does not allow entry of invoices and check run to be performed simultaneously. Must lock employees out of system until check run is complete. Slows down work process. System does not recognize discounts and credits; treats them as debits. Must make manual calculations to pay invoices for discounts and credits. Slows down work process; increases opportunities for human error. System does not properly reversevoided checks from prior years. Must prepare manual journal vouchers to reverse checks. Slows down work process; increases opportunities for human error. System does not allow editing of invoices once they have been posted to the general ledger. Must delete invoices and reenter them correctly. Slows down work process; increases opportunities for human error. System does not have a prompt command asking whether to reissue a voided check. Must manually monitor checks that are not to be reissued to avoid duplicate payments. Slows down work process; increases opportunities for human error. System does not allow invoices to be entered that have pricing discrepancies with the purchase order. Must use a spreadsheet to track invoices with discrepancies until they can be resolved. Slows down work process by creating an inefficient procedure requiring the use of duplicate records.
Unisys, the provider of the Delta financial system, does not agree with a number of the system limitations identified in Exhibit 7-27. Unisys provided the following comments to the limitations:
- Limitation - System does not allow entry of invoices and check run to be performed simultaneously.Response - Due to the high volume of data entry, DISD experienced occasional delays during the accounts payable check process when end-users (entering invoices) were simultaneously updating records that were also going to be updated during the check run. As with any database-driven system, a record must be locked when updates to that record occur to ensure data integrity. To avoid such delays, DISD has implemented their own system control to prevent access to these pivotal files during check runs.
- Limitation - Does not allow editing of invoices once they have been posted to the general ledger.Response - Accounts Payable option 16 was implemented on 10/16/99 to allow edit and deletion of invoices that have been posted to the General Ledger.
- Limitation - Does not allow invoices to be entered that have pricing discrepancies with the purchase order.Response - System has been consistently utilized to pay invoices with line amounts both higher and lower than the original purchase order amounts. However, the system provides the capability to restrict which users can overpay a purchase order.
DISD has made numerous modifications to the Delta system, yet problems persist. In fact, modifications made to correct problems have often lead to other problems that require additional modifications. The frustration caused by this cycle has lead accounts payable personnel to conclude that the only viable solution is a new financial system. In a November 13, 2000 memo to the CFO summarizing problems experienced with the Delta system, the Financial Systems Technical Support director wrote concerning a modification to the account payable invoicing module:The modification created slow-down in invoice processing. The average input time for processing was 10 invoices per hour; prior input capability -- 100 invoices per hour. The inability to pay using invoicing [module] slows the district to a halt.... [Vendor] provides a solution, however, other problems occur and the district does not return to invoice processing.
In a later section of the memo, the director wrote:The district went back to invoice processing October 19, . The ability to void prior checks was lost.... The maintenance release 'fixes' did not correct the erroneous data in the system; data integrity is a major issue. The software department using back door method corrected the incorrect data.
In yet another section, the director comments on the lack of documentation provided for Delta system modifications and echoes an audit management letter comment made by the district's external auditors. The director concludes by saying, in essence, that no further releases would be accepted because of their tendency to destabilize the system:The functionality that has been lost with the installation of new maintenance releases has been omitted from the user and technical notes for each release.... The lack of technical and user documentation has created a hazardous situation for the district. Fixes and modification[s] have been packaged into the maintenance release[s] that are critical to the operation of the system but the other 'unknowns' have crippled the system usage because it generally steps on modifications or fixes that corrected previously identified problems. The district will limit the acceptance of new releases to stabilize the system until the new financial system can be implemented."
Work with the Technology Services Division to improve deficiencies in the accounts payable system and ensure that any request for proposals (RFP) for a new system fully addresses employees' issues and concerns.
Accounts payable personnel should work closely with district technology personnel to ensure that any proposed system has the features the department needs. Moreover, accounts payable personnel should review the RFP in detail and insist upon their concerns being addressed during system evaluation, planning, design, testing and implementation.
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND TIMELINE
1. The chief financial officer ensures that the Accounts Payable director is on the new system selection committee. August 2001 and Ongoing 2. The Accounts Payable director establishes an Accounts Payable task force to ensure that all accounts payable needs and concerns are identified. August 2001 and Ongoing 3. The Accounts Payable director ensures that the concerns of the department are brought before the new system selection committee. August 2001 and Ongoing 4. The Accounts Payable director ensures that the proposed system meets all of the department's needs. August 2001 and Ongoing
This recommendation can be implemented with existing resources.
Activity fund money is collected by and expended for the benefit of individual schools and their students. Two types of activity funds are common to Texas public schools. Together, these funds are referred to as activity funds. The first type, campus activity funds, are generated from school pictures, vending machine revenues, commemorative items, etc. Principals control and spend these funds as needed for the benefit of the entire school. The second type, student activity or club funds, represent money collected and disbursed by student organizations for various student-related activities such as student councils, class funds and booster clubs. These funds are raised and expended exclusively for the benefit of students under the supervision of professional school staff. In Texas school districts, principals are the custodians of these funds and must provide for their proper accounting.
School districts must account for student activity funds separately from campus activity funds. Districts may maintain separate bank accounts for these funds but are not required to do so as long as they maintain separate accountability for student and district funds. Some districts account for activity funds centrally whereby all accounting is performed at central office. Schools collect and deposit the funds but must submit purchase requisitions to the district central office to use them. Other school districts use a decentralized model, allowing individual schools, under the oversight and supervision of central office staff, to administer and account for the funds. Regardless of the model used, all school districts are required to include activity funds in the annual financial audit conducted by independent auditors. The audit results are reported in the annual financial statements issued to the public.
TEA's FASRG outlines the requirements for activity fund accounting. Three fund types are used to record activity funds; the intended use for the money dictates the fund in which it should be recorded (Exhibit 7-28).
Exhibit 7-28Source: TEA Financial Accountability System Resource Guide.
Activity Fund Descriptions
Fund Purpose General Fund If the district's policy allows for excess or unused funds to be recalled into the General Fund for general school district use. Special Revenue Fund (Fund 461 - Campus Activity Fund) If individuals other than the students involved in the activity fund have the ability to use activity fund money in a manner that does not directly benefit the students involved in the activity funds but does benefit the school. Agency Fund (Fund 865 - Student Activity Account for Student Clubs and Class Funds) If the activity fund financial decisions rest solely with the students.
In addition to following FASRG guidelines, DISD schools must comply with the provisions of DISD's Activity Fund Manual. This manual, developed by the Internal Audit Department and last revised in June 1998, consists of 16 sections and 81 subsections covering topics such as banking practices and procedures, cash receipts and disbursements and purchasing procedures. The provisions contained in the manual constitute policy as established by DISD's Board of Trustees. Exhibit 7-29 provides an overview of the manual's contents.
Exhibit 7-29Source: DISD Activity Fund Manual.
Overview of DISD Student Activity Manual
Section Description 1.0 General Information 2.0 Banking Practices and Procedures 3.0 Cash Receipts 4.0 Cash Disbursements 5.0 Investment Accounts 6.0 Transfers 7.0 Petty Cash 8.0 Purchasing Procedures 9.0 Fund-raising Activities 10.0 Donations and Grants 11.0 Textbooks 12.0 Sales Tax 13.0 Loss of Property 14.0 Reporting Requirements 15.0 Forms 16.0 Accounting Guide
DISD uses a decentralized model to administer and account for activity funds. Each school maintains its own activity fund accounting records. Principals are primarily responsible for the proper administration of activity funds, while school office managers are involved in the day-to-day handling of activity funds. At the central office, the Quality Control Section oversees the administration of activity funds; reviews monthly reports, registers, and reconciliations; answers office managers' questions; assists office managers with resolving problems; and conducts training sessions for new office managers. At the end of the school year, each school sends substantially all of the activity fund books and records to the Internal Audit Department for the annual activity fund audit.
DISD schools received and disbursed more than $15.5 million of activity funds during fiscal 2000. The balance on August 31, 2000 was about $5 million. Exhibit 7-30 summarizes activity for fiscal 2000.
Exhibit 7-30Source: DISD General Accounting Department.
Activity Fund Financial Activity, Fiscal 2000
Type Fiscal 2000
August 31, 2000
Elementary Schools $5,911,445 $5,682,730 $2,045,354 Middle Schools $2,113,674 $2,085,722 $610,360 High Schools $6,747,801 $6,760,756 $1,900,397 Specialty Schools $1,010,839 $998,228 $535,301 Total $15,783,759 $15,527,436 $5,091,412
DISD's controls over its activity funds remain weak, despite past TSPR recommendations, annual internal audits and changes to written policies and procedures. During the 1992 performance review of DISD, TSPR made 298 recommendations of which three were related to activity funds. TSPR's follow-up report issued in October 1993 found that the district had rejected all three of the activity fund recommendations. In fact, of the 298 recommendations in the initial report, only six were rejected; three were related to activity funds. The most important of these three called for centralized accounting for activity funds.
Exhibit 7-31 summarizes TSPR's 1992 activity fund findings, recommendations, implementation status, and progress report comments.
Exhibit 7-31Source: TSPR's 1992 DISD Performance Review and October 1993 Progress Report.
Summary of Activity Fund Findings, Recommendations and Progress Report Comments
1992 TSPR Report
1993 Progress Report District Management's Comments All accounting for school activity funds is handled by the schools. Monitoring and auditing is performed by the DISD Internal Audit Department. An annual audit is performed on each of the 200 school funds. In addition, special investigations are conducted as needed. Establish a process and set of procedures for centrally banking, investing, and accounting for school activity funds. Decisions relative to the use of the funds should remain with the schools. Not Implemented School activity funds are the responsibility of local campuses. DISD feels that central fund control reduces campus access and creates a logistical challenge and additional administrative costs. The internal audit reports which we reviewed reported numerous incidents of shortages in funds. In one case, a misappropriation of $10,000 was found and the principal was terminated. From the information we were able to obtain, however, except for flagrant cases, there is no penalty for repeat offenders other than to refund the shortages which are discovered. Phase the schools into the centralized accounting system by implementing all elementary schools in 1993 and all middle and high schools in 1994. Not Implemented DISD feels this recommendation is not cost-effective. Centralized accounting of activity funds would create hardships on school staff as well as central staff. Significantly reduce the amount of internal audit staff time dedicated to school activity funds after the new system is in effect. Not Implemented DISD feels the reduction in internal auditing staff time would not outweigh the extra burden on campus staffs to generate daily transactions.
Since TSPR's 1992 review, the district has experienced many instances of theft and misappropriation of school activity funds. Internal Audit maintains a list of outstanding investigations arising out of audit findings. Findings of possible criminal activity are submitted to DISD's Safety and Security Department for further investigation. Of 55 outstanding investigations reported prior to September 2000, 26, or 47 percent, concern activity funds totaling $127,823 for the 19 cases, while the amount in question was not reported for the other seven cases. Exhibit 7-32 summarizes these open and pending cases.
Exhibit 7-32Source: DISD Internal Audit Department Report of Open and Pending Investigations.
Open or Pending Investigations of Misappropriation of Activity funds
Case Description Date Submitted Amount Disposition 1 Funds unaccounted for February-97 $52,000 Criminal Proceedings 2 Funds unaccounted for March-97 $2,804 Criminal Proceedings 3 Funds unaccounted for May-97 $23,000 Active with Dallas Police Department 4 Inappropriate use of activity funds October-97 not provided Referred to District Attorney 5 Funds unaccounted for/misappropriated March-98 $5,560 Pending Dallas Police Department 6 Funds unaccounted for. Altered receipts. Apr-98 $2,400 Referred to District Attorney 7 Funds missing from fundraiser May-98 not provided final disposition not determined 8 Fine arts funds missing May-98 not provided final disposition not determined 9 Funds stolen Jul-98 $2,130 final disposition not determined 10 Funds unaccounted for/counterfeit money Jul-98 $500 final disposition not determined 11 Funds unaccounted for Aug-98 $5,800 final disposition not determined 12 Unallowable expenditures Nov-98 $2,000 final disposition not determined 13 Funds unaccounted for Nov-98 $3,000 Employee resigned 14 Theft of fundraising money Nov-98 $1,000 Employee pays restitution 15 Receipts could not be traced Jan-99 $619 final disposition not determined 16 Activity funds stolen Jan-99 $13,000 Criminal Proceedings 17 Missing vending proceeds Feb-99 $525 final disposition not determined 18 Improper payments to employees Mar-99 $8,734 final disposition not determined 19 Missing funds Apr-99 $684 final disposition not determined 20 Funds unaccounted for Apr-99 $114 final disposition not determined 21 Activity funds stolen May-99 $253 final disposition not determined 22 Activity funds stolen Aug-99 $3,700 final disposition not determined 23 Fundraiser investigation Jan-00 not provided Under investigation 24 Fundraiser investigation Feb-00 not provided Under investigation 25 Activity fund investigation May-00 not provided Under investigation 26 Activity fund investigation May-00 not provided Under investigation Total $127,823
In addition to past instances of wrongdoing, audit exceptions have increased since fiscal 1998 (Exhibit 7-33).
Exhibit 7-33Source: DISD Internal Audit Department.
Activity Fund Audit Exceptions
Fiscal 1998 through 2000